andreas elpidorou

department of philosophy
university of louisville


my philosophical work is the product of my engagement with the single yet multifaceted question: “what is a mind?” my approach to the question is ecumenical, drawing on differing but ultimately complementing perspectives. from a metaphysical perspective, i consider the ontological status of the mind, its place in nature, and its relation to the body. from an experiential or phenomenological perspective, i investigate what first-person experience tells us about the nature of perception, imagination, and emotions. finally, from an empirically informed or cognitive-scientific perspective, i take up questions concerning the nature of explanation, the constitution and location of mental processes, and the relationship between philosophical theses and empirical findings. 

by adopting a philosophical outlook not restricted to a single methodological stance, i am able to make use of a variety of sources. in my work, i juxtapose issues from metaphysics,  philosophy of mind, phenomenology, epistemology, and philosophy of science, on the one hand, with findings from neuroscience and cognitive, social, and developmental psychology, on the other. i do so in an attempt to confront issues pertaining to the nature of the mind in a manner that is both systematic and comprehensive.


i am an assistant professor (term) in the department of philosophy at the university of louisville. previously, i was a visiting lecturer in the department of philosophy at boston university (2012-13). i hold a ph.d. in philosophy from boston university (2013) and a b.s. in physics from the university of virginia (2006). i was the recipient of a fulbright scholarship (2002-6), a leventis foundation scholarship (2009-11), and an earhart foundation fellowship (2012-3). for the 2009-10 academic year, i was a visiting scholar in the department of philosophy at the university of pittsburgh. in 2008, i was a junior visiting fellow at the institut für die wissenschaften vom menschen.

i work on philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of cognitive science and psychology, and phenomenology.


in preparation or under review   [pre-prints not available]

defending actualist physicalism

embodied conceivability (with g. dove)

can god save materialism?

reasons, causes, and neuropsychology

heidegger on mood and emotion (with l. freeman)


a posteriori physicalism and introspection. pacific philosophical quarterly [download]

the significance of boredom. in philosophy of mind and phenomenology, edited by. d. dahlstrom, a. elpidorou, and w. hopp. new york: routledge. [download]

introduction (with d. dahlstrom and w. hopp). in philosophy of mind and phenomenology, edited by. d. dahlstrom, a. elpidorou, and w. hopp. new york: routledge.

the phenomenology of emotions: an introduction (with l. freeman). phenomenology and the cognitive sciences (special issue on phenomenology and emotions)

phenomenal concepts. oxford bibliographies online


blocking the a priori passage. acta analyticaDOI: 10.1007/s12136-013-0206-4 [download]

reasoning about the mark of the cognitive: a response to adams and garrison. minds & machines. 24: 201- 211 [download]


having it both ways: consciousness unique, but                 not otherworldlyphilosophia, 41 (4): 1181 – 1203 [download]

moods and appraisals: how the phenomenology and science of emotions can come together. human studies, 36 (4): 565-591 [download]

the ‘new mind’ revisited or minding the vehicle/content distinction: a response to manzotti and & society 28 (4): 461-466 [download]

review of the oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology (ed. d. zahavi). notre dame philosophical reviews [download]


are phenomenal concepts perspectival? southwest philosophy review, 28 (1): 43-53 [download]  

      -— see also adam podlaskowski’s response to my article

where’s my mind? mark rowlands on the vehicles of cognition. avant: the journal of philosophical-interdisciplinary vanguard, 3 (1): 145-160 [download] 

     —- also published in polish as: “gdzie jest mój umysł?”


review of mark rowlands’ ‘the new science of the mind. philosophical psychology, 25 (5): 771-774 [download]

review of rob rupert’s ‘cognitive systems and the extended mind.’ minds & machines, 21 (1) : 107-13 [download]


imagination in non-representational paintingin ‘reading sartre : on phenomenology and existentialism,’ ed. j. webber. london: routledge [download]


review of alva noe’s ‘out of our heads.’ minds & machines, 20 (1) : 155-8 [download]

the upsurge of spontaneity and the rise of undivided subject: the role and place of merleau-ponty in the dreyfus-mcdowell debatein junior visiting fellows’ conference proceedings (vol. xxiv), ed. l. freeman. vienna: institut für die wissenschaften vom menschen [download]

in/visibility: perspectives on inclusion and exclusion: introductionin junior visiting fellows’ conference proceedings (vol. xxiv), ed. l. freeman. vienna: institut für die wissenschaften vom menschen [download]

edited volumes & special issues

philosophy of mind and phenomenology (co-edited with d. dahlstrom and w.hopp), new york: routledge, forthcoming [more info]

the phenomenology and science of emotions. special issue of phenomenology and the cognitive sciences (guest co-editor with l. freeman) [more info]


Fixed. theme by Andrew McCarthy